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OPEN WINDOW: 
MATTER OF LOVO’S IMPLICATIONS FOR 
TRANSSEXUAL AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES 
 
By Grisella Martinez, Esq.* 
A  valid marriage was defined under federal law in the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) in 1996,1 as one between a man and a woman.  Many le-
gal advocates recognized this legislation as a door slamming shut 
the possibility of legal recognition of same-sex marriages.  How-
ever, the DOMA failed to define the terms “man” and “woman.” 
Presumably this omission occurred because federal legislators 
and America’s heterosexual dominant culture did not contem-
plate scenarios involving men and women who had undergone 
sexual reassignment.  Congress’ failure to define these terms 
opened a window where marriage between a man and a post-
operative transsexual woman,2 or vice-versa, could be classified 
as a valid marriage under federal law,  thereby providing a basis 
for conferring immigration and other federal benefits.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmed this basis for 
immigration benefits in Matter of Lovo, which firmly established 
immigration benefits could be conferred on a spouse in a mar-
riage where the other spouse was a postoperative transsexual.  
MATTER OF LOVO: AN OVERVIEW 
The BIA3 held in Lovo4 that the DOMA “does not preclude, 
for purposes of federal law, recognition of a marriage involving a 
postoperative transsexual, where the marriage is considered by 
the State in which it was performed as one between two indi-
viduals of the opposite sex.”  In addition, the BIA held that “a 
marriage between a postoperative transsexual and a person of the 
opposite sex may be the basis for [spousal immigration] bene-
fits…where the State in which the marriage occurred recognizes 
the change in sex of the postoperative transsexual and considers 
the marriage a valid heterosexual marriage.”  The Immigration 
and Nationality Act (“INA”) states that U.S. citizens may file 
beneficiary petitions for “alien relatives” who are “immediate 
family members.”  Immediate family members, who qualify as 
“beneficiaries” of a petition, include spouses, as well as parents, 
and children.  The INA does not define who constitutes a 
“spouse” for purposes of immigration law.  
The petitioner in Lovo was a postoperative transsexual U.S. 
citizen woman who married a male citizen of El Salvador. The 
couple wed in North Carolina, and the petitioner subsequently 
filed a visa petition for her husband so that he could apply for 
lawful permanent resident status and acquire his “green card.”  
The petitioner provided the United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Service (“the Service”) with: 1) her North Carolina birth 
certificate showing her sex as “female;” 2) an affidavit from her 
physician attesting to her sexual reassignment surgery; 3) a 
North Carolina court order demonstrating her change of name;  
4) her North Carolina marriage certificate; and 5) her North 
Carolina driver’s license showing her name and her current sex 
as a female.   
During its investigation, the Service discovered that the Peti-
tioner was born a male in North Carolina, and had undergone 
sexual reassignment surgery to become a female.  The Service 
erroneously denied her visa petition stating that a valid marriage 
for purposes of immigration law was a federal question; there-
fore, her marriage was invalid because it was not between one 
man and one woman.  The Service found that the beneficiary 
was ineligible for immigration benefits as a spouse. The peti-
tioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the BIA. 
On appeal, the BIA stated that its analysis involved 
“determining first whether the marriage is valid under [s]tate law 
and then whether the marriage qualifies under the [Immigration 
and Nationality] Act.”5  The BIA concluded that under the statu-
tory laws of North Carolina,6 a valid marriage is one between a 
male and a female (although these terms were undefined in the 
statute) and that the law expressly prohibited same-sex mar-
riages.  The BIA also discussed provisions of North Carolina’s 
statutes that set forth requirements for amending birth certifi-
cates.7  These statutes explicitly permit the changing of an indi-
vidual’s sex on the birth record after sexual reassignment surgery 
and when proof of such surgery is provided from a licensed phy-
sician.  Based on these facts, the BIA determined that the peti-
tioner and beneficiary had entered into a valid marriage under 
the laws of the State of North Carolina.  
The BIA next addressed the second issue of whether the 
marriage qualified as a valid marriage under current immigration 
law.  It noted the absence of any language in the INA defining 
“spouse” and the failure of the DOMA to elaborate on the defini-
tion of “spouse” other than to state that “the word ‘spouse’ refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”8  
The BIA also closely examined the failure of the DOMA and 
federal law to address the specific issue of postoperative trans-
sexuals entering into marriage.  In addressing this failure, the 
BIA looked to several sources of statutory construction and inter-
pretation including the text of the DOMA, its legislative history, 
and relevant case law.  
Citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,9 the BIA followed the well-settled canon of statu-
tory construction that “if the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, as we clearly ‘must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”  
It found that the legislative history and plain text of the DOMA 
clearly applied to marriages between a man and a woman and not 
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to same-sex couples.  It also found that the House Committee 
Conference Report used the terms “same sex” and “homosexual” 
interchangeably and repeatedly addressed the repercussions of 
allowing homosexual couples to marry.  The BIA highlighted the 
fact that Congress never addressed the issue of marriage by post-
operative transsexuals in any legislative proceedings and found 
this failure to be remarkable in light of various state statutes rec-
ognizing transsexual marriage.10  The BIA held that:   
[T]he legislative history of the DOMA indicates that 
in enacting that statute, Congress only intended to 
restrict marriages between persons of the same sex. 
There is no indication that the DOMA was meant to 
apply to a marriage involving a postoperative trans-
sexual where the marriage is considered by the State 
in which it was performed as one between two indi-
viduals of the opposite sex.11   
Of even greater interest is the 
BIA’s conclusion that Congress did not 
intend to overrule long-standing case 
law that provides for state dominion in 
determining the validity of marriage.  
The BIA held that the recognition of 
such a marriage deemed valid under 
state law did not require Congressional 
authorization for the purposes of immigration.12 
However, the Service argued against this interpretation and 
asked the BIA to give the terms “man” and “woman,” as used in 
the DOMA, their “common meaning” when evaluating the valid-
ity of a marriage.  Arguing that chromosomal patterns conclu-
sively established “sex” because of their immutability, the Ser-
vice contended that females with XX chromosomes and males 
with XY chromosomes could never change their sex, even if they 
underwent sexual reassignment surgery.  The BIA rejected this 
argument, citing the great debate within the medical community 
concerning determinations of an individual’s sex.13  
Additionally, the BIA also recognized that not all individu-
als are born with strictly XX or XY chromosomes and that “[a] 
chromosomal pattern [was] not always the most accurate deter-
mination of an individual’s gender.”14  Furthermore, the BIA 
declared an individual’s original birth certificate did not provide 
an accurate method for determining gender.  The “incongruities” 
and “ambiguities” in medical criteria for determining a person’s 
sex using purely physical markers at birth supported this find-
ing.15  The BIA ended its analysis by reaffirming its position 
that, “for immigration purposes,” it is appropriate to use a cur-
rent birth certificate “to determine an individual’s gender.”16 
RECOGNITION OF THE ABILITY TO CONFER IMMIGRATION 
BENEFITS ON A TRANSSEXUAL SPOUSE AS A TWO-FOLD 
PRECEDENT 
Lovo raises many issues, not only for the transsexual immi-
grant community, but the greater transsexual community at large.  
The primary importance of the BIA’s holding is that the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice are 
bound by this precedent in adjudicating visa petitions and depor-
tation and removal proceedings involving transsexual immi-
grants.  On a broader scale, this holding is significant because it 
suggests that other agencies within the federal government may 
recognize the validity of transsexual marriages in conferring fed-
eral benefits on spouses.  
IMMIGRATION BENEFITS 
The full implication of Lovo has yet to be established.  To 
date, the Service has not adjudicated Lovo’s petition on remand 
from the BIA, but in theory, the Service cannot deny the petition 
solely because the petitioner or beneficiary is a transsexual.  
However, this does not preclude the Service from denying the 
visa petition on other grounds.  The most relevant example of 
this situation is the case of Donita Ganzon (a U.S. citizen Fili-
pino male to female transsexual) and her husband Jiffy Javellana 
(a Filipino male immigrant). 
       Donita Ganzon immigrated to the 
United States in the 1970s.  In 1981, 
she underwent sexual reassignment 
surgery.  Subsequently, she legally 
changed her name and sought recogni-
tion of her sex change through the Cali-
fornia state courts.  The state of Califor-
nia issued her a California driver’s license and allowed her to 
change her nursing license to reflect her sex as female.17  When 
she became a U.S. citizen six years later, her Certificate of Citi-
zenship listed her current name and her sex as female.  In addi-
tion, the United States State Department issued her a passport 
which listed her sex as female.  
In 2000, Ms. Ganzon met Jiffy Javellana in the Philippines.  
Approximately one year later she filed a fiancé visa for him with 
legacy INS18 and he entered the United States.  They married in 
Nevada a few months later.19  During their interview with the 
Service for Mr. Javellana’s green card, Ms. Ganzon revealed that 
she was a transsexual.  Shortly thereafter, the Service denied her 
husband’s application for permanent resident status based on the 
invalidity of his marriage to Ms. Ganzon.  The couple filed suit 
in U.S. District Court for the Western Division of California20 
seeking a declaratory judgment against the Department of Home-
land Security.  While the suit was pending, Mr. Javellana filed a 
second application for adjustment of status and hoped that the 
BIA’s ruling in Lovo would preclude the Service from denying 
him a green card based on the alleged invalidity of his marriage 
to a transsexual.  In October 2005, the Service d5enied Mr. Jav-
ellana’s application “in the exercise of discretion,” stating that 
Ms. Ganzon and Mr. Javellana had failed to prove that they en-
tered into their marriage in good faith and that the marriage was 
“bona fide.”21 
This case illustrates how future effects of Lovo have yet to 
be realized in the context of visa petitions and adjustment appli-
cations.  It remains to be seen whether the Service will grant the 
petition or deny it on another “discretionary” ground.  Regard-
less of the outcome, Lovo endures as precedent in immigration 
law and potentially allows transsexual spouses to claim immigra-
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tion benefits in other contexts aside from family-based visa peti-
tions.  Under Lovo, the opportunities for transsexual spouses to 
claim immigration benefits extend to employment-based visa 
petitions, non-immigrant visa petitions, asylum applications, and 
deportation and removal proceedings.  
For example, aliens sponsored for an immigrant visa by a 
United States employer may also file for derivative permanent 
resident status for their spouses and children.  Again, as with 
family-based immigrant visas, there is no definition of “spouse” 
and the couple need only prove that they entered into a valid and 
bona fide marriage.  Lovo also potentially applies to visa peti-
tions for non-immigrants.  This includes applicants for student 
visas, employment visas, diplomatic visas, and other special 
non-immigrant visa categories.  As long as a benefit is given to 
the visa holder’s spouse it could appropriately be considered 
under the BIA’s ruling.  Likewise, an alien filing for asylum, if 
granted, may also pass on benefits to qualifying “derivatives.”22  
In the case of a spouse, the only requirement for the spouse to 
receive benefits based on asylum (such as permanent resident 
status) is that the asylee married their spouse prior to receiving a 
grant of asylum.  
In deportation and removal proceedings,23 an immigrant 
may request various forms of relief from removal based on mar-
riage to a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident.  For example, 
when an “out-of-status”24 alien has continuously remained in the 
United States for over ten years, the alien may request cancella-
tion of removal based on “extreme hardship” to the U.S. citizen 
or legal permanent resident spouse.  Again, the statutes and 
regulations25 discussing cancellation of removal do not define 
“spouse” nor do they impose any other prerequisites on the mar-
riage, other than it be bona fide. Therefore, it is possible, under 
Lovo, that a transsexual spouse could claim or confer the benefit 
of marriage as a basis for relief from removal.  
To better illustrate this point, imagine the following: a U.S. 
citizen male to female transsexual legally marries a male immi-
grant who is out-of-status. He has resided in the United States 
continuously for over ten years prior to the commencement of 
his removal proceedings.  They have two adopted minor U.S. 
citizen children, but have no other immediate or extended family 
members in the United States.  The U.S. citizen wife does not 
work and the husband is the sole source of financial income for 
the entire family.  They own real property together and various 
other assets.  Under this set of facts, the Immigration Court is 
bound by the determination of the BIA in Lovo to allow the hus-
band to apply for cancellation of removal based on extreme 
hardship to his U.S. citizen spouse and children.  Although the 
grant of the application is still a discretionary decision made by 
the immigration judge, the husband could not be precluded from 
applying for cancellation of removal before the Court based on 
an “invalid” transsexual marriage.  In addition, if the judge de-
nies the application, the husband could appeal to the BIA, which 
would have the power to remand the case to the Immigration 
Court for a decision consistent with its holding in Lovo. 
Therefore, the extent to which the BIA’s holding in Lovo 
affects transsexual spouses has yet to manifest before the Ser-
vice or the Immigration Court.  The uncertainties involved in the 
ability of transsexual spouses to confer benefits as U.S. citizens 
or to receive them as immigrants has great potential for litiga-
tion in federal courts and before administrative agency adjudica-
tory bodies. 
FEDERAL BENEFITS 
If the DOMA does not preclude a transsexual spouse from 
conferring an immigration benefit on their legal spouse, then it 
follows that it would not preclude any transsexual spouse from 
conferring any federal benefit on their legal spouse.  This con-
clusion stems from the implication, drawn from Lovo, that a 
valid marriage under state law where a spouse is transsexual 
may serve as the basis for receiving or conferring federal bene-
fits on the other spouse, regardless of the DOMA.  
The arena of federal health benefits is a prime example of 
the potential benefits for married couples.  The federal govern-
ment currently employs more than two million people.26  The 
Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”), the self-proclaimed 
“human resources agency” of the government is responsible for 
administering the Federal Employees Health Benefit Program 
(“FEHB”) and several other benefits programs.27 
Under the FEHB Program, federal employees and their fam-
ily members are eligible for health coverage.  The enacting stat-
ute for the FEHB states that a “‘member of family’ means the 
spouse of an employee” as well as certain categories of chil-
dren.28  The statute does not provide a definition of the term 
“spouse.”  The accompanying regulation offers no further clari-
fication other than to state that the term “member of family” has 
the meaning set forth in the statute given above.29  Aside from 
the applicable statute and regulations, the only other source of 
guidance is the FEHB Handbook which reiterates that “[f]amily 
members eligible for coverage under your self and family enroll-
ment are your spouse (including a valid common law marriage 
[in accordance with applicable state law]) and children.”30 
There are no publicized cases where a federal employee 
attempted to confer health benefits on a transsexual spouse or 
where a transsexual federal employee attempted to confer bene-
fits on a spouse.  There is no reliable data on how many trans-
sexuals are residing in the United States,31 but probability dic-
tates that someone will inevitably raise a claim based on the 
ability to confer federal benefits to a spouse, in which one of the 
parties is a transsexual.  The OPM does have an adjudicatory 
board (the Merit System Protection Board) for handling various 
administrative issues, but they do not review health benefit is-
sues.32  Under the FEHB’s enacting statute “[t]he district courts 
of the United States have original jurisdiction, concurrent with 
the United States Court of Federal Claims, of a civil action or 
claim against the United States[.]”33 Therefore, the federal em-
ployee would have the right to file an action against the govern-
ment in federal court immediately. 
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CONCLUSION 
Lovo opens the door to analyzing multiple types of potential 
“federal benefits” conferred on transsexual spouses, including, 
but not limited to, Social Security, tax and veterans benefits.  
However, the factual dynamics of Lovo are very narrow and 
may raise other issues that potentially complicate the rights of 
those who do not fall into the same category.  This is because 
Lovo did not contemplate the numerous other possible permuta-
tions of transsexual marriage.  The BIA did not identify the pos-
sible outcomes if both spouses had been transsexuals.  It also did 
not take into account for the marriage of a transsexual woman to 
a biological man.34  Nor did it consider the applicability of its 
ruling to transsexuals trying to confer benefits but whom were 
unable to legally change their sex, were married in states that 
did not legally recognize changes of sex, or were already mar-
ried prior to having sexual reassignment surgery.  Therefore, 
while the BIA clearly recognized that there were potentially 
“anomalous results” in refusing to recognize legal changes of 
sex, the BIA did not fully address the consequences of its hold-
ing on a broader scale.35 
In the final analysis, Lovo is an important and precedential 
case not only in the immigration context, but also as a step for-
ward for the transsexual community as a whole.  Although the 
DOMA closed an important door for the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgendered community, the BIA’s holding in Lovo seems 
to have opened a window in the fight for transsexual rights.  It 
will take time and litigation in both the administrative and judi-
cial arenas to determine exactly how far these rights extend. 
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